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We examine the willingness to donate depending on whether “misery” is random generated or 
self-inflicted by too high demands in bilateral negotiations. We find that randomness has a 
positive influence on the total amount of donation. In case of self-inflicted “misery” we 
observe that the subject who may have caused the unfavourable situation receives 
significantly less than the perceived innocent subject.  
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People are willing to help others, in real life as well as in the laboratory. But would they also 
help if others’ misery is self-inflicted? We perform an experiment in which people give up 
more of their resources in order to help others if the latter’s misery is random rather than 
being self-inflicted. This result translates well into real-world circumstances, where people’s 
willingness to contribute to fund-raising is higher for catastrophes which cannot be regarded 
as the outcome of individual interaction (e.g. East Asia Tsunami victims) than for perceivably 
self-inflicted miseries (e.g. victims of alcoholism). Likewise, many readers of the Brothers 
Grimm’s fairy tales do not pity the fisherman’s wife strongly: She could have had a life of a 
queen but due to her excess demands she lost everything. Nevertheless, some people might 
help even her. Our paper presents clean evidence on such these cases of altruism. 
The fact that people are prepared to make sacrifices and thus improve the wellbeing of others 
is a well-known property in many kinds of experiment, the simplest case being the dictator 
game or variants thereof (e.g., Forsythe et al, 1994; see Camerer, 2003, pp.57-58, for a 
condensed overview). Altruistic giving depends not only on the donor's willingness to give, 
but also on who the receiver is. Eckel and Grossman (1996) found that allocators in the 
dictator game gave 2 to 3 times as much to the Red Cross than to some anonymous fellow 
participant. While in this case it is the receiver's reputation that is decisive, we aim at 
investigating the impact of receivers' actual, current behaviour.  
Third party punishment games are motivated in a somewhat similar way. The behaviour of an 
allocator in a dictator game is observed by a third party, who can then, if s/he wishes, sacrifice 
own resources to punish perceived norm violation (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Ottone, 
2005; Marlowe et al., 2008). However, what is observed by the third party in these 
experiments always a zero sum game. A nonzero-sum game, that better reflects a situation 
where misery is due to real loss of resources, has recently been used by Sutter, Lindner and 
Platsch (2009). While these authors focus on the effect that a third party's presence has on 
subjects playing the prisoners' dilemma game, we use a different nonzero-sum game to 
investigate the determinants of the third party's decision.  
We ask subjects to make their donation decisions in light of a breakdown in a bargaining 
game that has previously been carried out by two other players. The breakdown in the 
bargaining game can either be random or have been caused by disagreement. Does the cause 




donation decision? Intuitively, one might suspect that the willingness to donate is greater if 
the inability to reach agreement is not self-inflicted. 
A second question is whether a third party when allocating money to the players differentiates 
between them according to their perceived modesty, that is, their contribution to negotiation 
breakdown. I.e., does the third party behave more generously towards the party with the 
relatively low demand than that with the relatively high demand?  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We describe our experimental design and 
procedure as well as hypotheses in the next section. The results of our experiment are given in 
section 3. This is followed by tentative conclusions and an outlook on further research 
perspectives. 
 
2. Design and Hypotheses 
2.1 Design 
Two players are asked to reach an agreement over the allocation of a fixed sum of money 
among them. Each player simultaneously states the share of the money s/he demands. If the 
sum of the demands exceeds the total amount of the money available both players receive a 
zero pay-off, otherwise they receive their respective shares. In the case of disagreement 
between the players the third player has the possibility to allocate a fraction of her initial 
endowment among the bargainers. 
The experiment consists of a two-stage three-player game including decision makers A, B1 
and B2. 
In the first stage, B1 and B2 play a bargaining game about the distribution of 10 monetary 
units with 1 unit being equal to 1 euro. They simultaneously place demands b1 and b2, 
respectively, where b1, b2 ∈ {2.5, 3.75, 5, 6.25, 7.5}. If bargaining is successful with b1+ b2 ≤ 
10, the payoff is πB1 = b1 and πB2 = b2. If b1 + b2 > 10, bargaining failed and payoff equals 
zero for the time being. In the second step, player A is endowed with 20 units. If the players B 
agree, nothing happens, and A’s payoff is πA = 20. In contrast, in the case of disagreement 
between B1 and B2, A may opt to help out by donating amounts αB1 and αB2 to player B1 and 
B2, respectively, reducing her own payoff to πA = 20 - αB1 - αB2. This implies that B1 and B2 




Player A had to specify donations αB1 and αB2 for each of the four or six
1 hypothetical 
disagreement outcomes of the game (i.e., we employ the strategy method introduced by 
Selten, 1967). 
In order to obtain insights into changes in A’s behaviour two treatment variables, “random” 
and “rule out 50”, are applied, leading to a 2x2 factorial design. Table 1 summarizes the 
design. 
Table 1: Treatment variables 
  50 included  50 ruled out 
bargaining  bargaining breakdowns are 
self-inflicted, which would 
have been easy to avoid 
bargaining breakdowns are self-
inflicted, but understandable to a 
certain degree 
random  Players have no control 
over "bargaining" outcome 
Players have no control over 
"bargaining" outcome 
 
First, we look at the differences in A’s behaviour when comparing a setting in which the 
B-players’ result is bargained by two participants versus a setting in which the demands, and 
hence the result, are randomly determined by a lottery. Player A knows whether the game is 
random or bargained in the way described above.  
A first sight, this bears some similarity to research by Blount (1995), who finds responders' 
behaviour in the ultimatum game to depend on whether offers are randomly generated or 
actually decided on by proposers. However, here like in a number of further studies that 
identify the importance of intentions
2, intentions turn out to make a difference for those 
directly involved in the bargaining process. We study the preferences of people who are 
outsiders to the bargaining process and can change the payoffs after the other two players' 
game is completely played. 
 
                                                 
 
1 The number of disagreement outcomes depends on the treatment (“50 included” has more 
possible disagreement constellations than “50 ruled out”). 





Second, we consider a setting in which the B-players’ choices are restricted to b1, b2 ∈ {2.5, 
3.75, 6.25, 7.5}. Note that the option of claiming 50% of the pot is ruled out. This scenario is 
compared to one in which the full range of options is available. We introduce this variant to 
encourage disagreement and observe variance in player A’s decision making.  
Finally, to reduce unexplained variance due to unobserved altruism we conduct a dictator 
game yielding a further explanatory variable, a proxy for general level of altruism. In a 
separate experiment, player A is endowed with 20 of which she may donate any amount αD ∈ 
{0, ..., 20} to a randomly selected player resulting in a payoff πA = 20 - αD. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
Our subjects were mainly first year economics starters at the University of Kassel, without 
knowledge of experimental or theoretical economics.
3 The experiment took place in large 
classrooms; participation was voluntary. The sample includes only those 106 participants who 
had correctly answered a test question, intended to ensure that everyone understood the rules. 
In eight experimental sessions, two for each treatment, the sequence of the anonymous games 
was as follows:  
1.  All participants read the instructions and were asked to solve different exercises to 
ascertain that all understood the rules of the experiment. 
2.  All participants played the dictator game after having chosen an alias and a code 
number used for making the monetary payoff. Every participant was asked to play a 
dictator game and indicate whether she would like to donate to an anonymous person 
any of her 20 units of endowment, and if so, how many units she would be willing to 
donate.  
3.  Two players were randomly (but not publicly) assigned to the role of player B1, two 
further players to the role of player B2.  
4.  All other participants were put in the feet of player A. They were asked to choose 
generally whether they wanted to donate any of their initial endowment in the case of 
B1 and B2 disagreeing.  
                                                 
 
3 The freshman groups took part in an orientation week and were accompanied by more 
advanced students, who account for five percent of the sample. Excluding the more advanced 




5.  The game between two pairs of players representing B1 and B2 was conducted.  
6.  Each pair players of players B1 and B2 was randomly matched with one of the players 
A. In the case of agreement between B1 and B2, the latter were paid according to their 
demands and A kept 20 €. In the case of disagreement in the bargaining game, B1 and 
B2 were paid according to the decision player A had previously made for this case. If 
A donated, s/he kept the remainder of the initial endowment of 20 €. 
7.  Subjects had the choice between being paid by the experimenters after other subjects 
have left, or being paid later by a secretary in a separate room. 
 
The duration of the experiment was 20 minutes per group. The average payoff for each 
participant summed up to about 10 €/h. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses  
Our statistical assessment is based on the following main hypotheses: 
First, we expect that player A’s willingness to donate and the extent of donations are 
influenced by whether the disagreement is random or self-inflicted. This leads to our first 
hypothesis:  
H1:  A donates more if bargaining breakdown is randomly caused rather than self-inflicted.  
Moreover, in the bargaining case, does player A punish excessive demands? I.e., does she 
donate less to the person with the relatively higher demand? We expect that she sanctions the 
player who perceivably has caused the unfavourable situation by donating a higher amount to 
the innocent player, in other words: 






To test the first hypothesis, i.e., whether player A is more generous in the stochastic situation, 
we create the dependent variable meandonation as the average (over all combinations of b1 
and b2) of all amounts donated to B1 and B2. We regress meandonation  on the dummy 
variable selfinflicted, which is 1 if the harm is self-inflicted and 0 otherwise, on the treatment 
dummy incl50, which is 1 if the 50% option was available to negotiators, on the gender 
dummy "female" and on our proxy-variable for altruism. As meandonation is left-censored 
(36 of 114 observations take the value 0), Tobit analysis is used. Table 2 shows the results. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of willingness to donate 
 
Tobit regression  of left-censored dependent variable meandonation 
    
   coeff.    s.e. 
    
constant  -3.111 *** (1.999) 
selfinflicted  -1.966 *** (1.113) 
female  -1.351 *** (1.129) 
altruism  -0.907 ***  (0.177) 
incl50  -0.680 ** (1.126) 
Number of observations = 114, Pseudo R² = 0.057 (not to be interpreted as the R² in 
OLS regressions); standard errors in parenthesis 
 ***= 1%  level of significance, **= 5%  level of significance, *= 10%  level of 
significance 
 
We see that less is given if harm is self-inflicted (on average, 4.72 € in the latter case versus 
6.41 € for random disagreements). The amount given to those whose negotiations failed is 
larger for donors who gave more in the dictator game. If a subject is willing to give one more 
Euro in the dictator game, she would donate about 0.91 Euro more of her own money to 
players B1 and B2. Women give more, but the gender dummy is not significant in the 
statistical sense. Neither is incl50 significant; it does not seem to matter whether negotiator 
had the 50:50 option or not for the total amount given (adding an interaction term 
selfinflicted*incl50 did not improve the results). But it matters for the distribution of the total 
amount given, as we will show next. 
Hypothesis 2 presumed that player A (the donor) discriminates against the player B who 
caused the breakdown of the bargaining. Simple nonparametric tests lend support to this 
hypothesis in some constellations. The upper three rows shows what happens if one player 




demanded no more than 50%. In this case the greedy player is held accountable, and the 
modest player receives a markedly higher donation. The difference is not significant, 
however, if both demand more than 50%. This is obviously to be expected if both place the 
same demand (62.5% or 75%), these cases are left out in table 3. But also when one player 
demands less than the other, being "modest" in this sense, but still more than 50%, namely 
62.5%, both receive approximately the same donation (row 4 of table 3). There is no 
significant impact of the "extent of greediness", so to say, on donations.  
The two bottom rows of table 3 show donations for the case that a 50% demand was not 
possible. In one case, the sign of the difference between donations is unexpected, but the 
difference is significant in neither case, hence we refrain from interpreting the sign in 
differences and note that donators obviously realized that finding an agreement under our 
rules was evidently much more difficult if 50% of the cake cannot be demanded, hence on 
average they do not markedly punish the "greedy" negotiator. 
 
Table 3: Donations to negotiators after self-inflicted negotiation breakdown 





Given to actually modest 
negotiator 
 
Given to actually greedy 
negotiator 
37.5% / 75%  2.97     2.20   * 
50% / 62.5%             2.97      2.11   *** 
50% / 75%        3.26      1.79   *** 
62.5% / 75%     2.17      2.06    
 
  50% not possible 
37.5% / 75%  2.49      2.81     
62.5% / 75%     2.68       2.40     
 *: difference to amount given to modest negotiator significant at 10% level  
 ***: difference to amount given to modest negotiator significant at 1% level,  
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test 
 
Likewise, we can compare the amount given to the "accidental high demander" in the random 
demand treatment to the amount given to the actually greedy negotiator. We restrict this 










Given to accidentally 
greedy negotiator 
 
Given to actually greedy 
negotiator 
37.5% / 75%  3.96      2.20   *** 
50% / 62.5%             3.38      2.11   ** 
50% / 75%        3.52      1.79   ** 
62.5% / 75%     3.62      2.06   *** 
 
  Given to actually modest 
negotiator  
Given to accidentally modest 
negotiator 
37.5% / 75%  2.97          2.59          
50% / 62.5%        2.97           3.05     
50% / 75%        3.26      3.06     
62.5% / 75%     2.17      3.41    
 
*: difference to amount given to accidentally greedy negotiator significant at 10% level  
**: difference to amount given to accidentally greedy negotiator significant at 5% level  
 ***: difference to amount given to accidentally greedy negotiator significant at 1% level, Mann-Whitney-U-test 





The experiment we conducted shows clearly that people are on average prepared to sacrifice 
more of their resources in order to help others if the failure to allocate the common resource is 
the result of a random event. While breakdown in the bargaining game resulting from 
disparity of demands also leads to donations, these are on average much lower with the 
difference being statistically highly significant. 
One reason for such a differentiated behaviour might be the perception of the relatively high 
demand representing a form of greed. This goes in line with currently articulated resistance of 
taxpayers and politicians to bail out banks in distress. One common emotion is that the 
financial distress is self-inflected, grounded in greed and speculation of bank managers, who 
have undertaken risky bets to increase their bonus payments.  
Our result that the player who is mainly responsible for the bargaining breakdown receives a 
smaller donation than his counterpart is intuitively appealing. However, the fact that the 
former player receives something at all seems to be surprising. Two particularities of our 
experiments might have caused generosity towards the "greedy" negotiator. First, we used a 




a seemingly (i.e., game-theoretically irrelevant) higher value (three out of four aces), thus 
provoking a higher number of large demands than one would otherwise expect. The 
distribution of aces was not revealed to players A, who observed the bargaining game, but the 
complication might have raised some understanding for high demands. Second, almost all 
participants were freshmen; the experiment took part on the third day of their orientation 
week. This might have established some social ties.  
Anyway, we were not mainly interested in the level of altruism, but in circumstances that 
contribute to increasing or decreasing it. Organizations campaigning for donations might 
make use of our findings by emphasizing, whenever this is reasonably possible, that 
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